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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah R. App. Pro., and Section 78-22

( 3 )(j)/ Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. The judgment became

final by the Order denying Appellant7s Rule 59 motion entered on
September 4, 2002. Notice of Appeal was filed on October 2, 2002.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR, AND STANDARD OF, REVIEW
ISSUES PRESENTED:

Did the trial court err in granting Allstate's

summary judgment motion and denying Black's partial summary
judgment motion, and did the trial court further err in ruling
that the judgment in favor of Allstate and against Black was with
prejudice?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: As to the summary judgment rulings, the
standard is one of correction of error, with no deference given
to the trial court's rulings. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Statef
779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). As to the issue of with or without
prejudice, the standard is also correction of error, no
deference. Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001);
Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah
1986).
RECORD CITATION:

R. 318-319, 333-334; R. 398-408, 418-426, 435-

437.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Appellant's counsel is unaware of any Constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of, or of central importance to,
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this appeal, and is unaware of any controlling case authority as
to the particular situation arising in this case. However,
Appellant Relieves the issues in this case are governed by the
principles set out in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 701 P. 2d 795
(Utah 1985), and the numerous other cases dealing with the duties
attendant to insurance contracts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involved claims by Appellant Black against
his insurer, Allstate, for breach of contract, including breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and trial
court co-defendant Gallagher, for property damages. The claim
against Gallagher arose out of an automobile accident involving
Black and Gallagher on or about April 12, 1996. The claim against
Allstate arose out of the alleged breach of its contractual
duties to Appellant Black, which duties flowed from Appellant
Black's automobile insurance policy with Allstate, including the
duty to defend and to deal fairly and in good faith.
Appellant Black filed this lawsuit on December 31,
1998, R. 1^-7, and defendants Allstate and Gallagher filed
separate answers. R. 8-13, 14-17. After some discovery was made,
Respondent Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment, R. 2235, which Appellant opposed, R. 36-48, and Appellant Black filed
both a partial summary judgment motion, R. 299-313, and a motion
to compel, R. 84, 102-185, which Respondent Allstate opposed, R.
191-198, 186-190. [Note: At the hearing on the respective
motions, tfte court noted that Black's motion and principal
memorandum supporting his partial summary judgment motion was not
2

in the file, so Black's counsel provided the court with copies.
The copies are at R. 85-99, the originals are at R. 299-313.]
After a hearing on the respective summary judgment motions, the
court (Judge Frederick presiding) made a minute entry ruling
granting Allstate's motion and denying Black's motion "for the
reasons specified in Allstate's supporting pleadings and as
articulated at oral argument." R. 316-317. Appellant Black
objected to Allstate's proposed Order on the basis that it should
expressly state it to be without prejudice, based on Appellant's
belief from the hearing proceedings that the trial court's
rulings were grounded on the belief that Black's claim against
Allstate was not ripe for adjudication until the issue of
liability between Black and Gallagher was decided. Black also
asserted that the Order should contain a brief written statement
of the grounds for the court's rulings. R. 318-319. The court
denied the Objection, R. 331-332, and signed the original Order,
R. 3 3 3-3 34, and an Order denying the Objection, R. 335-3 36.
The case as against trial court co-defendant Gallagher
then proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable Stephen
Henriod on March 26, 2002. R. 380. Judge Henriod issued his
Memorandum Decision on March 27, 2002, which found Appellant
Black not negligent and defendant Gallagher 100% negligent and
entirely at fault for the accident and property damages claimed.
R. 383-389. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment
were entered on April 16, 2002. R. 392-397. The judgment against
Gallagher has been satisfied, and Gallagher is not a party to
this appeal.
3

On April 26, 2002, Appellant Black then moved the court
alter or amend the judgment as to Allstate, R. 398-408, 418-426,
which was opposed by Allstate, R. 411-417. Judge Henriod passed
the matter back to Judge Frederick, R. 429-442, who denied the
motion to alter or amend in a minute entry ruling, R. 433-434.
An Order denying the motion was entered on September 4, 2002,
which expressly asserted that the summary judgment in favor of
Allstate and against Black was with prejudice based upon Utah law
that as a third-party claimant, Black could not maintain a direct
cause of action against Allstate, R. 435-436.
Appellant Black filed his Notice of Appeal on October
2, 2002. R. 438-439.
STATEMENT OP FACTS
On April 12, 1996, Appellant Black was traveling north
on West Temple Street, approaching 3 300 South Street in Salt Lake
County, Utah. R. 302. Black entered the intersection of 3300
South and West Temple in the left-turn lane on a green light and
stopped in the intersection to wait for traffic to clear. R. 302.
Although it was raining at the time, the traffic light was
clearly visible at all times. R. 46. After the light turned
yellow to north-south traffic, plaintiff's vehicle was visible to
southbound traffic on West Temple and stopped in the intersection
waiting to complete its left-hand turn, while Gallagher's vehicle
was southbound on West Temple, going approximately thirty (30)
miles per hour, and a considerable distance from the
intersection, perhaps up to 50 yards. R. 46. After the traffic
signal turned red to West Temple traffic, a third vehicle which
4

was a few car lengths ahead of the Gallagher vehicle ran the red
light immediately in front of Black's vehicle, and Gallagher
appeared to hesitate briefly, R. 46. As cross traffic on 3300
South began to proceed on their green light and Black began to
complete his left turn, the Gallagher vehicle ran the red light
and smashed into the Black vehicle. R. 46.
According to the sole known independent witness, Roger
Anderson, (1) Black had no opportunity to avoid the accident, and
acted as any driver would have under the same circumstances
(i.e., reasonably), (2) that if the Gallagher vehicle had not hit
Black's vehicle it would have hit the cross tarffic on 3 3 00
South, (3) that the Gallagher vehicle did not appear to apply any
brakes until immediately before the impact, and (4) that the
Gallagher vehicle certainly could have stopped before reaching
the intersection. R. 47. (Anderson was traveling southbound on
West Temple next to the Gallagher vehicle at the same speed, and,
having begun braking in a normal fashion when the first
southbound vehicle ran the red light, was able to stop before
reaching the intersection. R. 45-47.)
Both the Black and Gallagher vehicles were insured by
Allstate Insurance Company. Black had only minimum no-fault
liability coverage, while Gallagher had liability and collision
(or comprehensive) coverage. R. 37, 301. Allstate proceeded to
adjust both Black's claim against the Gallagher policy and
Gallagher's claim against the Black policy together. R. 3 01. In
its "investigation" of the accident, Allstate failed to contact
the sole independent witness to the accident, Roger Anderson. R.
5

37, 47. In spite of conceding that Gallagher had clearly run the
red light, Allstate determined in its claims adjustment process
that Black was primarily at fault for the accident. R. 303, 308,
313.
After failing to convince Allstate of their error in
their adjustment determination, Black filed this lawsuit aginst
Allstate for breach of its contract with Black, specifically its
duty to defend Black against the Gallagher claim and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and against Gallagher
for liability for the damages suffered in the accident. R. 1-7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Black contends in this appeal that the trial court
erred in granting Allstate's summary judgment motion, in denying
Black's partial summary judgment motion, and in determining that
its grant of Allstate's summary judgment motion was with
prejudice.
As to granting Allstate's summary judgment motion,
Black argues that no interpretation of the grounds for Allstate's
motion were valid under the undisputed facts of the case, with
the possibly arguable exception of the ground of lack of
ripeness, and that in that event the judgment could not be held
to be "with prejudice."
As to denying Black's partial summary judgment motion,
Black argues that under the undisputed facts before the court,
Black was entitled to a determination that Allstate's
determination of fault in its adjustment process was erroneous as
a matter of law.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ALLSTATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Although Allstate's argument in its memoranda in
support of its summary judgment motion is not a model of clarity,
it appears that Allstate's grounds can be summarized under three
basic theories: 1. Declaring Black's claim against Allstate to be
an improper third-party claim under the Gallagher policy
(Allstate's mischaractization of Black's claim is primarily
argued in its reply memorandum), 2. Alleging that Black cannot
sue Allstate until after obtaining a liability judgment against
Gallagher, i.e. lack of ripeness, and 3. Black's claim against
Allstate is barred under the provisions of his policy contract
with Allstate.
A, Charactization of Black's Claim Against Allstate. This
basis for Allstate's summary judgment motion is only hinted at in
its initial memorandum in support of its motion, but is more
expressly stated in its reply memorandum. Black believes that
this ground is simply unsupportable under the facts and pleadings
herein, and is a gross mischaracterization of Black's claim
against Allstate as pled herein. Allstate essentially argues that
what Black is "really" doing is suing Allstate as a third-party
claimant against the Gallagher policy. This is completely untrue.
A review of the Complaint herein reveals that Black's
claim against Allstate is based on its alleged breach of its own
contract with Black, specifically its duty to defend Black
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against the Gallagher claim (which includes duties to diligently
investigate the claim against Black, fairly evaluate it, and
reasonably reject or settle it), along with the duty to deal
fairly and in good faith. Beck v. Farmers Ins, Exch,, 701 P. 2d
795, 801 (Utah 1985). Black believes that he has adequately
stated a claim against Allstate based on his own contract with
it, not as a third-party claimant against the Gallagher policy.
Some confusion arises in fact situations such as
occurred in this case by the somewhat inconsistent and
potentially confusing use of the terms "first-party" and "thirdparty" in these insurance matters. On one hand, the use of the
term "first-party" frequently refers to any situation of the
insured making a claim against his own policy, as opposed to a
situation where a non-insured, or "third-party" with no
contractual privity, makes a claim against the insured's
liability coverage. On the other hand, both terms are used under
the Beck analysis to refer to two distinct situations which can
arise as to an insured's claims against his insurer under the
provisions of the insured's own policy. One type, referred to as
"first-party" in Beck, concerns where the insured herself files a
claim with her own insurer under her own policy coverage. See,
e.g., Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 480 P.2d 739
(Utah 1971). The other type, referred to as "third-party" in
Beck, concerns claims of an insured against her own insurer for
breaching its duty to defend the insured against claims made by
third parties against the insured. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967). Black's claim against
8

Allstate herein is of this type, and entitles Black to recover
against Allstate in tort, not just in contract, because of the
fiduciary nature of the relationship. Beck, supra, at p. 799.
Thus, Black's claim against Allstate herein arises out
of his own contractual relationship with Allstate, and Allstate's
attempts to mischaracterize it as a "third-party" claim against
the Gallagher policy must be rejected.
B, Allstate's Policy Provision Defenses. The second apparent
ground for Allstate's summary judgment motion is provisions in
Black's policy, commonly referred to as the "duty to defend" and
"no direct action" clauses.
Under the "duty to defend" clause, Allstate asserts
that because of this clause in its contract with Black, it "may
settle any claim or suit that it believes is proper." However,
this covenant to defend Black clearly does not give Allstate
carte blanche authority in adjusting and settling claims against
Black's liability policy. Allstate's suggestion that this clause
gave it unfettered discretion to make whatever decision in
adjusting the Gallagher claim against Black's liability coverage
is unsupportable. If that were true, there would be no Beck
"third-party" cases at all. Beck, supra; Ammerman, supra. What
the covenant to defend the insured against non-insured claims did
do is place a heightened, fiduciary duty upon Allstate to see
that Black's best interests were protected. Beck, supra at p.
799. It is this contract provision that allows Black to sue not
just in contract, but in tort. Id. It cannot be used as a shield
by Allstate against Black's claim that it breached that very part
9

of his contract with Allstate.
The second contractual provision of Black's policy
cited by Allstate is the "no direct action" clause. However, this
provision is simply a bar to any third-party claimants against
Black's liability policy from suing Allstate directly in the
first instance as to liability for damages from an accident with
Black. It cannot be a bar to Black's claims against Allstate for
tort or breach of contract for failing to live up to the duties
it owed Black as the insured under his own policy.
Furthermore, Allstate's argument that its policy
provisions bar Black from bringing this action appears to be in
conflict with limitations of the Utah Insurance Code which state
that an insurance policy may not, among other things, "provide
that no action may be brought, subject to permissible arbitration
provisions in contracts." Section 31A-21-313(3)(c), Ut. Code Ann.
C. Ripeness Issue. Allstate asserts that Black "has no right
to sue Allstate until after a judgment is obtained against
Gallagher—if and when one is ever obtained." This would be true
under Utah law, as a result of the "no direct action" clause, if
Black was in fact suing Allstate solely because of a denial of
his claim against the Gallagher policy. However, because Black's
claim against Allstate is based on its breach of his own contract
with Allstate, including the duties to defend and deal fairly and
in good faith, the "no direct action" clause is inapplicable.
Support, Hebert v. Guastella, 409 So.2d 375 (La.App. 1982). Black
is unaware of any legal precedent in Utah as to this particular
issue, that is, whether an insured may sue in the same action
10

both an alleged tortfeasor for liability for an accident and the
insured's own insurer for breaching its contract in wrongfully
acceding to that alleged tortfeasor's liability claim against the
insured's policy. Black believes there are no significant policy
reasons to prevent such a combined lawsuit in light of the
court's ability to bifurcate the claims under Rule 42, Utah R.
Civ. Pro. The trial court herein, at the hearing on the parties'
respective summary judgment motions, seemed to focus only on this
ripeness issue, believing that Black would first have to obtain
judgment against Gallagher as to liability for the accident
before proceeding against Allstate. See, transcript of the April
3, 2000, hearing at R. 444 and Addendum A of this Appellant's
Brief.
It is Black's position that his claim against Allstate
was, in fact, ripe because, as between Black and Allstate, the
facts were undisputed and Allstate's liability determination made
in its adjustment of Black's and Gallagher's claims together was
erroneous as a matter of law. See, Point III, infra. Even if this
Court agrees that Black's claim against Allstate could not
proceed until the case against Gallagher was resolved, the trial
court could have simply ordered the bifurcation of the claims
rather than granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment.
Further, even assuming that this Court upholds the trial court's
decision to grant Allstate's summary judgment motion based on a
lack of ripeness, that judgment could not have been "with
prejudice." See, Point II, infra.
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POINT II
LACK OF RIPENESS CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR TOSSING
OUT BLACK'S CLAIM AGAINST ALLSTATE WITH PREJUDICE
Appellant Black believes that the grant of Allstate's
motion for summary judgment was undoubtedly erroneous if based on
either (a) mischaracterizing Black's claim against Allstate as an
improper "third party" claim against Allstate under the Gallagher
policy, or (b) the contractual "duty to defend" and/or "no direct
action" provisions of the Allstate policy. In the event that this
Court decides that the trial court did not err in granting
Allstate's motion due to lack of ripeness, then the judgment in
favor of Allstate and against Black cannot have been "with
prejudice" as stated in the Order denying Black's motion to alter
or amend the judgment with respect to Allstate.
Because summary judgment prevents litigants from fully
presenting their case to the court, courts are, and should be,
reluctant to invoke that remedy. Brandt v. Springville Banking
Co. , 353 P.2d 460 (Utah 1960). The rules of procedure encourage
the adjudication of disputes on their merits. Bonneville Tower v.
Thompson Michie Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). It is
readily apparent that granting summary judgment because of a lack
of ripeness is not an "on the merits" determination, but merely a
finding that a prerequisite to addressing the merits of the claim
is lacking, which abates the determination of the claim on the
merits. Id. Therefor, if the trial court's ruling against Black
was based on the absence of a judicial determination of the claim
against Gallagher, it must be without prejudice, and the court's
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entry of an Order to the contrary is reversible error. Support,
Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001); Bonneville
Tower, supra.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BLACK'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE, UNDER THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS BEFORE THE COURT, ALLSTATE'S
DECISION AS TO LIABILITY IN ITS ADJUSTMENT
PROCESS WAS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW
Although it may be suggested that this issue was
rendered moot by the trial court's bench trial decision finding
Black not negligent and Gallagher 100% negligent in causing the
accident which gave rise to this lawsuit, Black believes it still
has significance with regard to the question of whether his claim
against Allstate was ripe for adjudication. This is because of
the somewhat unusual situation that although Gallagher, in
defense of Black's claim against him for tort liability for
Black's property damage arising from the accident, maintained
that he did not run the red light, as to Black's claim against
Allstate, Allstate conceded the fact that Gallagher did run the
red light and that the facts of the accident were not in dispute.
See, Hamblin letter, Exhibit A of Black's Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at R.308; and the failure
of Allstate to controvert any of Black's alleged undisputed
facts, found at R. 301-303, in its Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 191-198, as
Black pointed out in his reply memorandum, R. 199-204.
Thus, as between Black and Allstate, the undisputed
facts of the accident were as set forth in Black's memorandum
13

supporting his motion for partial summary judgment, R. 301-303.
Black's position is that under those undisputed facts,
Allstate's adjustment determination of fault was erroneous as a
matter of law, under the following analysis as set out in Black's
principal memorandum supporting his partial summary judgment
motion, R. 303-307:
Under well accepted principles of negligence and rules
of traffic regulation, it must be concluded that not only was
Allstate's determination of liability on the claims of Black and
Gallagher contrary to common sense, but erroneous as a matter of
law.
Every determination of the issue of the negligence of a
party to an automobile accident, or any liability claim based in
the law of negligence, begins with the determination of what
duty, if any is owed to the other party. Owens By and Through
Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989). Such a
determination is a question of law to be decided by the court.
Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778 (Utah 1992). Without a
duty, there can be no negligence as a matter of law, and summary
judgment is appropriate. Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt
Lake City, 919 P.2d 586 (Utah 1996). Under the law and rules of
traffic regulation and the facts of this case, Black neither owed
nor breached any particular duty to Gallagher, and therefore was
not negligent as a matter of law, and, consequently, Allstate's
determination of 60% negligence on the part of Black in its
evaluation of the claims of Black and Gallagher was erroneous as
a matter of law.
14

It is a well-settled principle of traffic law and
regulation that motorists driving on streets protected at
intersections by traffic lights are justified in assuming that a
driver approaching such intersection understands the signals and
won't cross against them, and therefore need not anticipate that
a driver will enter the intersection in violation of a stop
signal. Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice § 114.111 (3d ed.
1965) (hereinafter "Blashfield"). In other words, persons having
the right of way are entitled to rely on the assumption that
other drivers will obey traffic signs or signals and not run a
red light or stop sign. Kelbaugh v. Mills, 671 A.2d 41, 45 (Md.
App. 1996); Cassidv v. Valenti, 621 N.Y.A.D. 405 (1995); Morgan
v. Braasch, 446 S.E.2d 746 (Ga.App. 1994); Horton v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 641 So.2d 993, 999 (La.App. 1994); Smith v. Brooks, 575
A.2d 926, 934 (Pa.Super. 1990); Vaccaro v. Sports & Imports,
Inc., 539 So.2d 989 (La.App. 1989). Utah has also recognized this
basic principle in its case law. Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,
1336-1337 (Utah 1993)(Rule that left-turning vehicle must yield
right of way to approaching vehicles which constitute immediate
hazard is inapplicable where approaching vehicle is required to
stop); Smith v. Gallecros, 400 P.2d 570, 572 (Utah 1965); Morris
v. Christensen, 356 P.2d 34, 35 (Utah 1960); Williams v. ZCMI,
312 P. 2d 564, 565 (Utah 1957).
In light of the above proposition, a motorist who is
turning on a favorable signal, such as plaintiff herein, is not
negligent with respect to a collision with an oncoming vehicle
for which the light was then red, as Allstate concedes it was for
15

Gallagher in this case, Blashfield § 114.129. In such
circumstances, there is no negligence and summary judgment is
appropriate, as a number of cases have held. Cassidy v. Valenti,
supra at 406-07 (summary judgment on liability upheld where
plaintiff making left turn and hit by cross traffic which ran red
light); Morgan v. Braasch, supra at 748-49 (defendant ran stop
sign, summary judgment granted plaintiff); Olson v. Parchen, 816
P.2d 423, 426-27 (Mont. 1991)(question of contributory negligence
should not be submitted to jury where driver obeying basic rules
of road didn't see other driver fail to yield right of way,
because failure to see was not proximate cause of accident, but
failure to yield was); Dale v. Carroll, 509 So.2d 770, 777
(La.App.2 1987)(no negligence/no duty at all on party who enters
intersection on green light vs. party who did not enter on green
or yellow; entitled to assume other driver would stop
appropriately); Vender v. Stone, 802 P.2d 606, 608 (Mont.
1990)(where party was lawfully in intersection waiting to
complete left-hand turn, other party approaching on cross street
and colliding with left-turning party was solely responsible for
accident as a matter of law, even if light had turned green by
the time cross-traffic party entered intersection); support,
Dolbercr v. Paltani, 549 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Neb. 1996)(no duty,
absent exceptional circumstances, for motorist with favored green
light to anticipate others running red light).
Under the acknowledged facts of this case, Black was
lawfully in the intersection attempting to complete his left-hand
turn after his light turned red, when defendant Gallagher ran his
16

vehicle through the red light well after it had turned red and
collided with Black's vehicle. As the cases cited above show,
under such facts there was no duty on the part of Black to
anticipate and guard against such flagrantly negligent conduct by
Gallagher, and, as a matter of law, there could be no finding of
negligence on the part of the Black. The court must therefore
conclude that Allstate's "liability determination" to the
contrary was erroneous as a matter of law. There are no facts
present which would remove this particular accident from the
clear, well-established rules set forth above. Thus, Allstate's
determination was not only contrary to common sense, but contrary
to the law as well.
Since the trial court was faced with the situation of
Black and Allstate not disputing the basic facts of the accident,
and that those facts lead, as a matter of law, to the conclusion
that the "fault" for the accident was entirely Gallagher's, there
was simply no need, as to the Black v. Allstate claim, to wait
for a decision on Black's claim against Gallagher, and Black's
claim against Allstate was ripe for adjudication.
CONCLUSION
When Allstate was faced with opposing claims against
the two policies it had issued to the two parties involved in the
accident giving rise to this lawsuit —

Black and Gallagher —

it

decided to adjust both claims together, in spite of the obvious
conflict of interest. Appellant Black believes it will be readily
apparent that Allstate took this course of action for the sole
reason that, by doing so, it could save Allstate a few thousand
17

dollars. Allstate then determined, contrary to both the law and
common sense, that the accident was primarily the fault of Black,
who was lawfully within the intersection doing what he was
supposed to do, instead of Gallagher, who was unlawfully in the
intersection after running a red light.
Black was forced to filed suit, his claim against
Allstate clearly alleging Allstate breached its contract with
Black, specifically its duty to defend Black against the
Gallagher claim and its duty to act fairly and in good faith.
Allstate defended itself by mischaracterizing Black's claim as an
impermissible third-party claim against the Gallagher policy, and
by arguing erroneously that the claim was barred by Black's own
policy language. Apparently Allstate believes that the duties and
obligations set out in the Black policy apply to Black but not to
Allstate.
The trial court clearly erred in granting Allstate's
summary judgment motion and denying that of Black, and this Court
should reverse the trial court's decisions relating to the Black
vs. Allstate claim, and remand it to the trial court for further
discovery and trial on the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jgf - day of March, 2003.

^^- / ? ; ^
Eric P. Hartmah
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on April 3, 2000)

3

THE COURT: No. 3, Black versus Gallagher, et cetera.

4

This is case No. C-983344.

5

the record.

Counsel, state your appearances for

6

MR. NELSON: Chris Nelson for Allstate, your Honor.

7

MR. HARTMAN: Eric Hartman on behalf of Chris Black.

8

MR. HARDCASTLE: Lloyd Hardcastle on behalf of Shirl

9

Gallagher.

10
11

THE COURT: Very well.
summary judgment.

12

This is Allstate's motion for

Mr. Nelson, you may proceed.

MR. NELSON: Thank you, your Honor.

I think this

13

is a very straightforward matter.

14

Gallagher are both Allstate insureds under different policies.

15

The plaintiff and Mr. Gallagher were involved in an automobile

16

accident on April 12th, 1996.

17

to have sustained about $3,800 worth of property damage to his

18

vehicle.

19

The plaintiff and Shirl

In that accident plaintiff claims

The plaintiff brought action not only against

20

Mr. Gallagher for the negligence of the —

21

accident, but also against Allstate directly.

22

asserted that because —

23

negligent in the accident, Allstate, Mr. Gallagher's insurance

24

company, is responsible directly to Plaintiff to pay his claim.

25

arising from the
Plaintiff has

I think because Mr. Gallagher was

The plaintiff claims additionally that there's bad

-31

faith because he is also an Allstate insured, even though,

2

your Honor, the negligence and the issue of liability is

3

Mr. Gallagher's liability.

4

that under Utah law —

5

the plaintiff cannot sue Allstate directly on the insurance

6

policy of another person.

7

there's no basis for that kind of an action.

8
9

We filed this motion asserting

and I think Utah law is clear on this

—

That's a third-party claim, and

In our reply memoranda, your Honor, I refer to
a case, Sperry versus Sperry.

It's a case that the Utah

10

Supreme Court resolved in October of last year, 1999, where

11

the Court determined whether in a situation very similar to

12

the one we have here, whether the claimant was a third-party

13

claimant or a first-party claimant.

14

In that case, your Honor, the plaintiff filed a claim

15

with her insurance company against her own husband for the

16

wrongful death of her son.

17

both insureds of AMCO Insurance Company.

18

refused to settle her claim for the wrongful death action, and

19

so she brought a claim for wrongful —

Her husband and her —

and she were

The insurance company

or for bad faith against

20 I the insurance company.
21

The Utah Supreme Court said that in that situation she

22

must be considered a third-party claimant, not a first-party

23

claimant, and the Court affirmed the trial Court's dismissal of

24

the bad faith action that she brought against her own insurance

25

company.
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That's the same situation we have here, your Honor.

2

Plaintiff is merely a third-party claimant against Allstate,

3

and he can't pursue these claims directly against Allstate.

4

His remedy, your Honor, is to pursue the claim

5

against Shirl Gallagher, and if he receives a judgment, then

6

Mr. Gallagher, because of his relationship with Allstate, will

7

resolve that judgment, again, if there happens to be one.

8

we believe, your Honor, that we're —

9

summary judgment.

So

Allstate is entitled to

10

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Nelson.

Thank you.

11

Mr. Hartman, you may respond.

12

MR. HARTMAN: I assume this is being taped?

13

THE COURT: It indeed is.

14

MR. HARTMAN: Okay.

I'd like to preliminarily or once

15

again raise my concern as to the apparent missing motions for

16

partial summary judgment and to compel that appear to not be in

17

the Court's file but which were filed.

18

First of all, I'd like to say this being a motion

19

for summary, all the allegations of the plaintiff are taken as

20

true, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom are also

21

indulged in favor of the plaintiff.

22

I think what defendant Allstate is actually asking

23

this Court to do is reform the complaint of plaintiff to

24

simply allege a claim against Mr. Gallagher on Mr. Gallagher's

25

liability policy.

However, that's not what the plaintiff has
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done here.

2

If the Court finds the plaintiff's pleadings against

3

Allstate are in some manner deficient, then the plaintiff

4

would request an opportunity to amend those, because what

5

we're dealing with here is plaintiff, Chris Black, suing his

6

insurer, Allstate, for breach of contract, including the breach

7

of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, in handling the

8 I Gallagher claim against his policy, which is in fact a first9

party claim.

10

Now, Allstate wants to have their cake and eat it,

11

too.

12

to an auto accident were insured by Allstate.

13

what a reasonable company would do —

14

those claims out to some independent adjuster —

15

ahead and adjusts both claims together, makes a determination

16

and then sends it out and then wants to turn around and say

17

that Allstate didn't owe any duties to anybody.

18

They have in this case a situation in which both parties
So instead of

ship at least one of
Allstate goes

What we're saying is Allstate can't have its cake and

19

eat it, too, because when they are taking Gallagher's claim

20

against the Black policy, they owe Chris Black certain duties

21

which are alleged in plaintiff's complaint.

22

good faith and fair dealing.

23

owe —

24

investigate and perform an evaluation based on the facts that

25

are presented to them.

They owe a duty of

They owed a duty to defend.

They

part of that duty to defend is a duty to reasonably
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This is where the fallacy of defendant Allstate

2

argument comes into play*is reflected in Plaintiff's motion

3

for partial summary judgment, because under the facts as

4

accepted by Allstate, as accepted by Allstate —

5

have produced absolutely no facts to controvert the factual

6

allegations of the plaintiff in his motion for partial summary

7

judgment, absolutely none —

8

Allstate, it is Plaintiff's belief that Allstate's so-called

9

liability determination in adjusting these opposing claims, was

and they

under those facts as accepted by

10 I erroneous as a matter of law.
11

Now, as between Plaintiff and Gallagher, Mr. Gallagher

12

may well want to continue his stance that in fact he did not

13

run the red light, but Allstate has accepted the fact that in

14

fact Mr. Gallagher did run the red light.

15

light, but ran it several seconds after it turned red.

16

THE COURT: Doesn't —

Not only ran the red

excuse me for interrupting.

17

Doesn't there, though, have to be a final determination as to

18

the liability question between Gallagher and Black before the

19

question of bad faith refuses to settle under your theory of

20

the law?

21

MR. HARTMANr No, I don't

—

22

THE COURT: Ultimately?

23

MR. HARTMAN: No, I don't think it does.

24

THE COURT: And why?

25

MR. HARTMAN: Well, for one —

No. 1, because under the
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particular facts of this case, there is no —

2

in my view, a legal determination that in fact Allstate's

3

liability decision was erroneous as a matter of law, because

4 I
5

improper driving alleged against Mr. Gallagher?

I mean, if

—

MR. HARTMAN: As between Plaintiff and Gallagher, it
doesn't, because Gallagher

8
9

—

THE COURT: Well, how does that bear upon the issue of

6
7

there should be,

—

THE COURT: Then why is it that we're confusing the
whole question of contract law and/or bad faith refusal to

10

settle on the party plaintiff against its own carrier, with the

11

issue of liability against Gallagher that's been pending since

12

1996 for $3,800?

13
14

Why are we confusing

—

MR. HARTMAN: Well, it hasn't been pending, according
—

I mean, Allstate

—

15

THE COURT: It hasn't happened, though.

16

MR. HARTMAN: Allstate basically —

has basically

17

denied liability, but let me run through the facts of this

18

case, your Honor.

19

Gallagher —

my client, Chris Black, was proceeding

20

northbound on West Temple.

He approached the intersection of

21

3300 South, and he was going to take a left-hand turn.

22

went into the left-hand turning lane, entered the intersection

23

and stopped and waited.

24

cars went through on the yellow light.

25

red.

The light turned yellow.

So he

A couple of

Then the light turned
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As he took his foot of the brake, a car proceeded to

2

run the red light directly in front of him.

3

the cross traffic beginning to move on 3300 South, he again

4

started to —

5

intersection, when Mr. Gallagher's vehicle ran through the red

6

light and smashed into him.

7

what he was supposed to do —

Then as he saw

lawfully clear the

Now, it is the statement of the sole eye witness that

8

Mr. Black did what everybody else would have done under the

9

circumstances.

10
11

That Mr. Gallagher easily had time to stop,

because the witness was driving right alongside of him.
THE COURT: Okay.

Well, what you're arguing to me here

12

has to do with the liability question of Black v. Gallagher,

13

but that's

14

—

MR. HARTMAN: As to Allstate's position.

It doesn't.

15

What it has to do with is the liability decision as Allstate

16

looked at it, because, as I say, Gallagher may still claim that

17

he did not in fact run the red light, even though Allstate

18

clearly concluded that he in fact did run the red light.

19

Here's the situation, your Honor.

Both parties

20

are insured by Allstate.

Chris Black had only liability

21

insurance.

Shirl Gallagher had liability and collision

22

insurance.

Allstate looks at this claim, and low and behold

23

years of training in adjusting insurance claims give them the

24

ability to defy common sense and assert that the primary cause

25

of the accident was in fact Chris Black's lawfully attempting
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to complete his turn, as opposed to Shirl Gallagher's driving

2

through the red light a few seconds after it had turned red.

3

Allstate accepts those facts of the accident.

4

What I'm saying is, based on Allstate's acceptance of

5

those facts, their determination of —

6

motion for partial summary judgment that their determination of

7

liability is erroneous as a matter of law.

8
9

we are showing in our

THE COURT: And I'm not suggesting, Mr. Hartman, that
your client doesn't have a claim against Allstate for bad faith

10

either, but it seems to me that before one could reasonably

11

accept an adverse party to accept one's view of the facts,

12

there has to be a legal determination of what the facts are.

13
14

MR. HARTMAN: But what we're saying, your Honor, is
that as between the plaintiff and Allstate, there are no

15 I disputes as to the facts of the accident.
16

THE COURT: If this were a separate action, if you had

17

the case of Black versus Allstate, Allstate would be in here

18

arguing to me that I couldn't rule as a matter of law on the

19

matter until the issue of Black versus Gallagher is resolved.

20

Don't you think that might occur?

21

MR. HARTMAN: No, I don't.

22

THE COURT: Why?

23

MR. HARTMAN: The point is, this is a first-party

24

claim.

There are various aspects of the claim.

25

they failed to defend.

One is that

All cases say even though insurance
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companies have given themselves in their boiler plate language

2

the right to make such settlements and compromises as they deem

3 I expedient to some degree —

although that's not the language in

4

this particular policy —

5

that have said this does not give them totally unfettered

6

discretion to resolve these cases.

7

that they must do so on a reasonable evaluation of the facts,

8

which are not in dispute, and they must do so in good faith.

9

all the cases that have addressed

Now, part of our claim is that they have breached the

10

contract in —

11

deal with Gallagher's claim

12
13
14
15
16

In fact, all the cases say

that they had with Black to defend him and to
—

THE COURT: Just a minute, defend Black?

Black is the

plaintiff.
MR. HARTMAN: But as to Gallagher's claim, Black is in
fact the defendant.
THE COURT: Okay.

Well, in any event, Mr. Hartman,

17

what I'm going to do, given the circumstance that your position

18

is that you filed a number of pleadings that apparently didn't

19

make it onto the docket, and you've now given me copies of

20

those, I'm going to take the motion under advisement

21

MR. HARTMAN: May I

22

THE COURT: —

23
24
25

—

—

and I'll notify you of my decision by

(inaudible) ruling shortly.
MR. HARTMAN: May I say just a few more brief things,
your Honor?
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2

THE COURT: Briefly, Mr. Hartman,

I have evidentiary

hearings at this time.

3

MR. HARTMAN: I understand.

What we're saying, your

4

Honor, is that Allstate's position on this is apparently that

5

they can make whatever determination in a first-party situation

6

against their insureds that they feel like, and the insureds

7

cannot sue them for breach of their contractual duties that are

8

owed under the policy.

9

THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that's your argument,

10

and I'll accept that as your argument.

11

Counsel.

12

We'll be in recess,

Thank you.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I just want to make sure

13

you have my pleadings on Plaintiff's motion.

14

they're in the file.

Well, I think

15

THE COURT: I have pleadings I will review in the file.

16

MR. CHRISTENSEN: If it doesn't appear, will you please

17

contact me and I can send you

—

18

MR. HARTMAN: Your Honor, may I

19

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I can also give you some more

20

MR. HARTMAN: I'm sorry, a reply memo was filed on

21

—
—

Friday, and I don't know if you got that or not.

22

THE COURT: I did get that.

23

MR. HARTMAN: You did.

Okay.

24

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Counsel.

25

(Hearing concluded.)

Thank you, your Honor.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS BLACK,
ORDER
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Civil No. 980913344
vs.
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
SHJJRL GALLAGHER, an individual, and
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs Motion to Alter, Amend or Grant Relief from Judgment came before the
court after receipt of plaintiff s Notice to Submit for Decision. After review of the relevant
pleadingsfiledby the parties, the court finds:
Plaintiff has already presented his arguments that he should be able to renew and
maintain an action against Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). He has also already asserted
that Allstate's prior summary judgment was granted without prejudice and based solely on a lack
of ripeness. This Court has entertained these arguments and rejected them. Furthermore, the

prior motion for summary judgment granted in favor of Allstate was based upon well-established
Utah law that as a third-party claimant, plaintiff cannot maintain a direct cause of action against
Allstate.
Accordingly, the Court hereby denies plaintiffs Motion to Alter, Amend or Grant
Relief from Judgment.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS BLACK,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 980913344
vs.
Judge Dennis Frederick
SHIRL GALLAGHER, an individual, and
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants.
On April 3, 2000, the court heard oral argument on Allstate Insurance Company's
Motion for Summary Judgment and on plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Allstate
was represented by Christian W. Nelson. Plaintiff was represented by Eric P. Hartman. Codefendant Shirl Gallagher was represented by Lloyd A. Hardcastle. After review of the pleadings
presented by the parties on both of these motions, and after the presentation of oral argument, the
court hereby grants Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
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